Introduction
In 1896 John Dewey's "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" was published (Psychological Review, 3, July 1896, 357-370; EWS^ö-lOg 2 ). This article has not only been considered a crucial Step in the development of Dewey's thinking (cf. Bernstein, 1966, p. 15; Hahn, 1969, p. 27; Smith, 1973, p. 122; Slccpcr, 1986, p. 21; Alexander, 1987, p. 41) , but also an important step in the development of psychology (cf. Langfeld, 1943; Murphy, 1961, p. 27,29; McKenzie, 1975, p. xiv-xv) . In this article Dewey criticizes the way the physiological idea of the reflex arc is used in psychology. The alternative view of behavior and the explanation for behavior that Dewey develops, is almost unanimously considered to be the starting point for functionalism in psychology (cf. Titchener, 1898, p. 451; Langfeld, 1943, p. 148; Flügel, 1964, p. 194; Bernstein, 1966, p. 15; Phillips, 1971, p. 566; Eisenga, 1973, p. 102; Verbeek, 1977, p. 141; Lcahey, 1987, p. 270-271) .
We shall draw on this article to introduce Dewey's position and give an evaluation of its topicality. We shall then confront Dewey's ideas with some aspects of John Bowlby's attachment theory. It should become apparent that Dewey has formulated the paradigm within which attachment theory can be placed. Looking at attachment theory from a Deweyan perspective enables one to indicate which elements in the theoretical framework of attachment theory need further elaboration and how this might best be approached.
The Reflex Are Concept in Psychology and Dewey's Critique
By thc end of the nineteenth Century psychologists were convinced that it was possible to overcome the dualistic presuppostions of associationist psychology. Physiology had provided the structural unit of afferent nervcs, central nervous System and efferent nerves. Psychologists transposed this unit ofstructure into a unit oifitnction of peripheral Stimulus, central processing and motor response. This 'reflex arc' model was thought sufficient to explain human behavior (cf. Smith, 1973) . The model resolved both the mattcr-form dualism ('Sensation' and 'idea') of associationist psychology (by locating sensations and ideas in one process), and the body-mind dualism (by taking the mind to be the processes in the brain). Human behavior could now bc explained from the physical, anatomical structure which meant that no essential distinction between animal and human behavior was to bc made. The model was, therefore, in agreement with the theory of evolution.
In his article Dewey expresses the opmion that by using the idea of the reflex arc concept in psychology "the principles of explanation and classification which the reflex arc idea has replaced (...) are not sufficiently displaced" (EW5:96). According to Dewey "(t)he older dualism between Sensation and idea is rcpeated in thc current dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions; the oldcr dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism between Stimulus and response." (EW5:96). This is caused by thc fact that the sensori-motor circuit or System is interpreted from "prcconceived and preformulated ideas of rigid distinctions between sensations, thoughts and acts." (EW5:97). As a result psychological theory-building Starts with "disjomtcd parts" and must then attempt to explain how thc separate parts work together or interact. In Dewey's opinion attcmpts to explain thc interaction either by introducing an "extra-experimental soul" or by giving an explanation in terms of "mechanical push and pull" (EW5:100), must be refuted bccause they contradict the biological-evolutionary points of departure which form the basic assumptions both of physiological psychology and of Dewey himself. 3 Becausc the theory of evolution "include(s) man under the same gcncrali/ation with othcr facts of nature" (EW1:210), an ontological dualism that prcsupposes two substanccs (mind and body) is impossiblc. This mcans Although functionalism can better bevicwcd äs a lincof rcasoning than a real schoolof thoughl (sce,cg,IxMhey, 1987 , p 278, Verbcek, 1977 ,p 126, Eisenga, 1973 that an "extra-experimental soul" does not fit into a physiologically based psychological theory.
Dewey also rejects the idea of "mechanical push and pull," because it presupposes an organism at rest that can only be activated by Stimuli from the cnvironment. This notion of an isolated, autonomous organism is also contradictory to the theory of evolution. "The idea of environment is a necessity to the idea of organisms, and with the conception of environment comes the impossibility of considering psychical life äs an individual, isolated thing developing in a vacuum." (EW1:56). Organism and environment are not from the outset two autonomous entities. "Only by analysis and selective abstraction can we differentiate the actual occurrence into two factors, one called organism and the other, environment." (LW5:220). This implies that the organism cannot be considered äs an organism-at-rest, having a completely rested, neutral and unpreoccupied Status. "(T)he state of the organism is one ofaction which is continuous" (LW5:223). It is against this background that Dewey reconstructs the reflex arc concept.
Co-ordination
An adequate psychological use of the reflex arc idea should not Start with disjointed parts, but has to begin with an organic unity. "What is wanted is that sensory Stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall be viewed ... äs divisions of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc" (EW5:97). "The process all the way around is assumed to be the unit" Dewey writes (in a letter to Angell; see Coughlan, 1975, p. 139) . According to Dewey "this reality may most convcniently be termed co-ordination." (EW5:97).
Dewey gives a reinterpretation of "the familiär child-candle instance" from James' Principles ofPsychology to demonstrate how he is using the term co-ordination. "The ordinary Interpretation would say the Sensation of light is the Stimulus to the grasping äs a response, the burn resulting is a Stimulus to withdrawing the hand äs response and so on." (EW5:97). But, from a psychological point of view, this analysis is inadequate. "Upon analysis, we find that we begin not with a sensory Stimulus, but with a sensori-motor co-ordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the movement of body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of what is cxperienced. In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a Sensation of light." (EW5:97). On the basis of this analysis Dewey concludes that "both Sensation and movement lie inside, not outside the act" (EW5:98). Dewey is also using the term co-ordination in a more cncompassing sense. With the stimulus-response analysis the whole process of seeing light -reaching for it -burning the hand -withdrawing the hand, can only be characterized äs "the replacing of one sort of experience by anothcr" (EW5:99). Only a fragmentary account of the state of affairs can be given. Dewey, however, is able to show the connection between these sequential acts using the concept of co-ordination (see also EW5:99).
The Status of the Mental
It may seem that the concept of co-ordination must be considered a mental capacity because of the way in which Dewey uses the term. Such an assumption would imply that the mental retains a central position in Dewey's philosophy. This is, however, not the case. Dewey wants to do two things. On the one hand he wants to formulate a monistic psychology, because in a psychology consistent with the principles of evolutionary theory there can be no place for an ontological dualism between mind and matter. On the other hand Dewey wants to incorporate the mental into his psychology. The only way to solve this is to show the continuity between (primary) physiological processes and (secondary) mental functions. Dewey provides two arguments which sustain this conclusion. Firstly, he shows that the principle of coordination can be applied both to the most fundamental physiological level and to the more complcx mental level. Secondly, he shows how the devclopmcnt from the fundamental (i.e., physiological) processes of co-ordination to the more differcntiated (i.e., mental) processes of co-ordination should be conceivcd.
Co-ordination is primarily a physiological process. Dewey typifics the 'primary quality' of the organism äs "movement äs seif sustaining through sclection and assimilation of environment" (EW5:304). Within the organism a "specialization of labor" takes place with a "consequent need of interrelating or co-ordinating structure". That co-ordinating structure is the nervous System. "(T)hc nervous System has one primary inclusive function: co-ordination of specialized activities to a common end." (EW5:308). In the process of evolutionary developmcnt Dewey distinguishes between an "increasing ränge of co-ordination," "co-ordination of movements with each other" and "coordination of movements with sensory aclivities." Within this latter modus of co-ordination, Dewey distinguishes between "(a) reflex action, (b) instinct, (c) formed habit, (d) delibcrative activity" (EW5:307) 4 . Where Dewey uscs the term "delibcrative," mental capacities (i.e., thinking) are first introduced. Thought plays no role at the level of 'reflex action' and 'instinct' and this is also the casc with 'formed habits'. "Thought arises in conflict of activities, through the need of striking a balance, that is, of discovering the course of action which will rcconcile a number of conflicting minor activities"
Dewey uscs the principle of co-ordination also in an even more extensive sense. In his course on Educational Psychology (1896) he distinguishes stages in child development; each stage is characterized by its own 'co-ordinatory taste' (EW5:310-311). At the level of adolescence Dewey speaks of "The Co-ordination of Onc's Activity äs a Whole with That of Othcrs in Society (HW5:311). (Dewey, 1938, p. 107 ).
Dewey's Transactional Paradigm
Dewey typifies human behavior äs a biological-physiological process of co-ordination, a continuing attunement of organism and environment to each other äs a result of which both the organism and the environment change in ordcr to realise a Situation of optimal adaptation. The word Optimal' might suggest that Dewey holds that it is possible to state which adaptation is absolutely optimal. Dewey, however, keeps telling us that both organism and environment change. So there cannot be one state of the organism that will always guarantee an optimal 'fit'. The activities of the organism bring about changes in the environment which in turn can disturb the state of equilibrium reached. Optimal' must be seen äs strictly situational. In attachment theory a similar idea can be found in Hinde, who suggests that there is a ränge of behavioral stratcgies for adapting to different niches (cf. Hinde, 1982b) .
According to Dewey, the process of co-ordination becomes increasingly complcx and encompassing. Mental functions originale wiihin this process and fulfil a function in the increasing refinement of the ever more complex and encompassing processes of co-ordination. Dewey does not place the mental alongside the physical (äs had been the case in psychology before Dewey) but neither does he deny the mental (äs would become the case in psychology after Dewey). Dewey's functionalism does not stop at just indicating the function of thinking in the process of (evolutionary) adaptation (a sort of functionalism that, e.g., can be found in Titchener, 1898). Dewey shows that thinking is one of the functions of the organism; a function that has developed in the ongoing process of'interaction' just äs, for example, can be said of the digestive System.
While psychology (and philosophy) before Dewey had drawn heavily on concepts such äs 'mind' and 'consciousness', the introduction of evolutionary ideas leads to a shift of attention from 'mind' to the interaction of organism and environment. "The old center was mind ... The new center is indefinite interactions ..." is Dewey's summary of this 'Copernican Revolution' (cf. LW4:232).
As we have citcd above: "Only by analysis and selcctive abstraction can we differentiate the actual occurrence into two faclors, one called the organism and the othcr, environment." (LW5:220). Bccause of the fact that the tcrm 'interaction' implics two separate entitites, Dewey, in his later works, prcfers to use the tcrm 'transaction' to denote the initial totality within which, from a certain perspcctivc and for certain reasons, organism and environment can be distinguishcd (cf. Dewey & Bentley, 1960, p. 122-124).
Bowlby's Attachment Theory: 'Behavior Systems' and 'Control Theory'
Bowlby's attachment theory is an ethological theory (Bowlby, 1988, p. 1) based upon "analytical biology and control theory, which together have elucidated the basic principles that underlie adaptive, goal-directed behavior" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 37) . Ethology departs from the principles of evolutionary theory. Bowlby praises ethology for not only studying the morphological and physiological characteristics of animals from the Darwinian framework of adaptation-for-survival, but also their 'behavioral equipment' (cf. Bowlby, 1982, p. 54-55) .
One of the central concepts in Bowlby's theory is the ethological concept 'behavior System'. A behavior System is a System postulated to explain behavior by thinking of more complex behavior äs a compilation of, and cooperation between, more simple behaviors. The concept "is used in an explanatory sense to refer to Systems postulated äs controlling behavior" (Hinde, 1982b, p. 62) . With the help of this concept, explanations of behavior are given in which there are "lower-level Systems controlling behavioral acts," "control Systems postulated to explain interrelations between the several types of behavior" and "higher-order control Systems" (Hinde, 1982b, p. 66 ). Bowlby elaborates on this (hierarchically ordered) classification of behavior and behavior Systems by differentiating (in increasing order of complexity) "rcflexes," "fixed action patterns" and behavior in which "a fixed action pattcrn is combined with a simple sequence that is dependent on feedback from the environment" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 67) . Bowlby notes that "just äs therc are many different types of behavioral Systems so there are a number of diffcrent ways in which their activities can be co-ordinated" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 74) . Various more or less 'elementary' behavioral acts are observed and are thcn placcd in a coherent System. This systematization is based on the function that more elementary behavior performs in reaching a certain goal, and providcs the means by which ethology tries to explain behavior.
While in the more elementary 'behavior Systems', patterns of behavior are such that thcy go 'straight for the goal', in the case of more complex behaviors (and the corresponding more complex behavior Systems) principles of 'control theory' are introduced. The main concepts of control theory are 'setting', 'set-goal' and 'feedback' (Bowlby, 1982, p. 43) . In the case of, for example, a thermostat the sct-goal is keeping the temperature at a certain Icvel and the setting is the actual temperature that is wanted. While in the case of a thermostat the 'setting' has to be instituted by a human bcing, it is also possible to envisage a System which reccives its setting from anothcr System. Bowlby gives the example of automatic anti-aircraft guns which rcccive their Information from a radar-screcn (cf. Bowlby, 1982, p. 44) . It is Bowlby's opinion that "this type of System is rcplicated in living organisms" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 44) . Which behavior system must be activatcd in what way, depends on the comparison between the current Situation and the Situation that is wanted; a comparison in which 'feedback' plays an important part. Bretherton (1985) pointed out that the attachmcnt behavior System must not be seen äs a system-at-rest that is switched on to reach the set-goal and is switched off when the set-goal is reached. According to Bretherton the attachment behavior System is always active in coordinating different subsystems to reach and maintain the set-goal.
When control theory Starts to play a role in the ethological explanation of behavior, cognitive capacities make their entry. It is evident that "ultimately 'goal-directed' behaviour must imply that the animal has some model or correlate of the goal Situation before that Situation is achieved, and the behavior is governed by the discrepancy between current and goal situations. (...) An internal correlate of the goal can, but need not, imply cognitive abilities on the part of the animal" (Hinde, 1982a, p. 76) . According to Hinde the hesitation of ethologists to introduce cognitive powers in explaining "complex social behaviour of higher mammals" is understandable but inappropriate. This hesitation has led, unfortunately, to "the neglect of many interesting phenomena" (Hinde, 1982a, p. 76-78) .
Bowlby assumes that behavior Systems are adapted to the environment in which they originated because they are the product of the evolutionary process of Variation and selection. This means that nowadays behavior systems can only function adequately in a Situation that does not differ too much from the original 'environment of evolutionary adaptation' (cf. Bowlby, 1982, p. 47; Bowlby does not make clear what he means exactly by 'too much'). This implies that the organism must be able to recognize certain characteristics of (or characteristic patterns in) the environment. So, according to Bowlby, we must presuppose that "the individual organism has a copy of that pattern in its CNS and is structured to react in special kinds of ways when it perceives a matching pattern in the environment and in other kinds of ways when it perceives no such pattern" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 48) . "(A)s well äs having equipment that enables thcm to recognise special parts of their environment, members of all bul the most primitive phyla are possessed of equipment that enables them to organise such Information äs they have about the world into Schemata or maps" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 48) . Bowlby prefers to speak of a 'working model' instead of a 'cognitive map', because the latter is a too static concept (cf. Bowlby, 1982, p. 80) . The individual can, äs it were, look at, change and adjust the model and can use the model äs a reference to plan his actions. The notion of "a model in the brain is that it constitutes a toy that is yet a tool, an imitation world, which we can manipulate in the way that will suit us best, and so find out how to manipulate the real world, which it is supposed to represcnt" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 80) . By the use of language we can exchange our working models so that we need not re-invent the whecl over and over again.
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So in Bowlby's elaboration of attachment theory two cognitive abilities are postulated: "(a) a means of receiving and storing instructions regarding the set-goal, and (b) a means of comparing the effects of performance with instruction and changing performance of it" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 70) .
Discussion
A comparison of Dewey's ideas with attachment theory shows that both depart from evolutionary theory. In both cases we also find a similar strategy for the explanation of behavior: complex behavior is explained by seeing it äs a co-ordinated composition of more elementary behavior, and elementary behavior is in the end viewed äs biological-physiological. From this we can conclude that the 'paradigm' for explaining behavior Dewey formulated around the turn of the Century has, in the last two or thrce decades, led to a flourishing research-program, especially since the introduction of ethology into psychology.
Dewey's significance lies in the fact that he has shown that an elaboration of (monistic) evolutionary principlcs need not imply that there is no place for mental 'faculties' in the explanation of human behavior. On the contrary: the mental must be considered äs real äs the material (the physiological). There is no argument for viewing certain 'results' of the proccss of evolutionary devclopment (äs, e.g., the mental, but also language and culturc) äs having a lower Status or äs being Icss relevant to the process of adaptation and change than othcr 'results' (äs, e.g., reflexes or the digestive System).
When we apply Dewey's elaboration of the evolutionary principlcs to attachment theory, we are led to the conclusion that the latter is unclear on the issue of the Status of the mental. Whilst attachment theory considcrs the physiological-biological level to be real, it is often the case that äs soon äs mental functions are introduccd in explaining behavior, recourse is made to the levcl of explanation. Ethology wants to explain behavior by postulating behavior Systems. Hindc dcscribes an attachment behavior System äs "a System postulated äs controlling the scveral types of attachment behavior" (Hinde, 1982b, p. 64) . Tb bc able to explain more 'complex' behavior, the principles of control theory are applied. Exactly at the point at which those principlcs are introduccd, mental capacities arcpresupposed in order to arrive at an adequatc explanation.
In attachment theory, thcn, there is a differcncc betwcen the ways in which the physiological and the mental level are discussed. This diffcrcnce can be partly traccd to a diffcrencc betwecn description and explanation. But
In Iheorclical psychology there is also a reassessmcnt of Dewey's ideas. See, for cxample, Natsoulas (1983) who discusses the way in which the concepls 'conscious' and 'consciousness' should be used and clahorates cxplicilly on ideas Dewcy formulatcd äs early äs 1906 (see Dewey, 1906 ).
Dewey and Attachment Theory besides the fact that, from a philosophical point of view, the validity of such a rigid distinction between description and (theoretical) explanation can be questioned, Dewey has shown us that in this case there is no need to make any such distinction. Moreover, any such distinction is contrary to the evolutionary principles subscribed to by attachment theory.
We conclude that further research needs to be done into the ways in which the mental is used in attachment theory. We think that a Deweyan perspective might be helpful in realizing a more adequate conceptualization of the mental. A reconceptualization is not only necessary for theoretical reasons, that is, to get a theory that is consistent with its basic evolutionary assumptions. But also, to the extent to which attachment theory ascribes to mental capacitics a direct influence on behavior, a more adequate and consistent way of viewing these capacities can contribute to the practical relevance of attachment theory.
